

THE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE BUDDHIST AND THE NAIYĀYIKA PHILOSOPHERS :

A BRIEF SURVEY

- Dr. Sanjit Kumar Sadhukhan

Philosophy is nothing but the human quest for truth. From very remote time Indians are blessed with the spontaneous curiosity about what truth is. The first literature containing the truth realized by the ancient Indians is the Vedas. The philosophy revealed in this literature was more or less tuned with human helplessness together with submission to nature Gods. This went on unchallenged till the Buddha preached his new doctrine which afterwards brought about a head-on collision with the Vedic stricture, but the Buddha denied to give any positive answer to any Vedic approach and consequently in later period a gigantic philosophical system was built up against the Vedic philosophy or more accurately there rose a protest against the unverified doctrine. In the *Brahmajāla-sutta* of *Dighanikāya*, *Kathāvatthu* and the Upanisads we find that the philosophy has taken a challenging attitude by now¹. The people also were clearly divided into two major groups. On the one hand, the Brahmins were there with the Vedic philosophy and on the other, the Buddhists came forward with their new philosophical doctrines.

It was the beginning of the Christian era when such a situation was created that the Brahmin and the Buddhist philosophers considered their respective philosophical views unsuccessful if those were not directed against the opponent and at the same time not victorious. It is obvious that the introduction of the debate system was largely responsible for the creation of this situation.

The fundamental difference in outlooks between realism and idealism led to mutual confrontations which continued in an unbroken line for generations of scholars resulting in the growth of a rich and vigorous literature. In this way a section of the Brahmin philosophers developed a philosophical system predominantly with the science of reasoning (*nyāya*). Later the system was known as Nyāya philosophy. The first systematic work on the Nyāya philosophy is the *Nyāya-sūtra* of Gautama. It is supposed to be a work of about 150 A.D. Going through this work, we can undoubtedly say that much before the

composition of this work the Buddhists had already put forward a lot of strong arguments that helped their views to give birth to a concentrated self-sufficient system of philosophy.

We find in the *Nyāya-sūtra* that Gautama refutes several doctrines of the Buddhist philosophy, such as, the whole is not separate from its parts², momentariness of things³, denial of the external object⁴, voidness of everything⁵ and so on. But it should be kept in mind that these doctrines could not assume the highly sophisticated forms by that time. And Gautama's refutation also does not show much complicity of thought to turn those down.

Then there is a century of silence. In this period the followers of these two schools obviously went on with their studies but, no remarkable work was composed.

Now came ahead a Buddhist scholar to protest against the views of Gautama. He is none other than Nagarjuna⁶, who is the first outstanding philosopher to propagate the fundamental philosophy of voidness (*śūnyavāda*). Dr. Stcherbatsky seeks to explain the background of the advent of this school in this way, "... Monism took the offensive and finally established itself triumphantly in the very heart of a new Buddhism. Transplanted upon a fresh soil the old Monism produced a powerful growth of various systems. In the schools of Nagarjuna and Deva it received a dialectical foundation, in the way of a dialectical destruction of all other systems⁷".

In the *Mādhyamika-Kārika*, Nagarjuna tries to establish his theory of voidness by contradicting many of the actual *Nyāya-sūtra*. He composed the oldest Buddhist treatises on the art of debate, viz., *Vigraha-vyāvartanī* and *Pramāṇa-viśeṣa*. In *Vigraha-vyāvartanī*, going to prove the voidness of things Nāgārjuna has shown his daring attitude of uprooting even the existence of the *Pramāṇas*. As he was an exponent of a particular 'nihilistic' theory, naturally he could not also check the temptation of striking at the root of the categories proposed by Gautama. His *Pramāṇa-viśeṣa* is exclusively a refutation of the sixteen categories contained in the *Nyāya-sūtra*. By applying his critical axe of relativity he claims that all the sixteen categories are relational and therefore ultimately unreal.

This Buddhist theory of voidness was one of the crucial points for a Nyaya exponent named Vatsyayana. Going to prove his theory, the Buddhist Nāgārjuna started with demolishing even the existence of the instrument of valid knowledge. But Vatsyayana started with a strong protest and a crucial defense of *Pramāṇa* and the very first line of his commentary reads *Pramāṇato' rtha pratipattau pravṛttisāmarthyād arthavat pramāṇam*.

Gautama formulated the *sūtras* but Nāgārjuna flayed them mercilessly and Vātsyāyana who belonged to the lineage of the Naiyāyika was prompted to write a commentary on the *Nyāya-sūtra* in about the late 4th century or early 5th century. The commentary bears the title *Nyāya-bhāṣya*.

In course of explaining the *Nyāya-sūtras*, Vātsyāyana raises objections against Nāgārjuna's doctrine of voidness of things which is discussed in the *Mādhyamika-kārika* according to which our means and objects of knowledge are as unreal as things appearing in a dream or exhibited in jugglery or as the city of the celestial choirs or as a mirage. Vātsyāyana argues against the Vijñānavāda philosophy (i.e., the theory of idealism) on the *Nyāya-sūtras* iv. 2. 26-7 and iii. 2. 11 and against the momentariness on the *Nyāya-sūtras* iii. 2.11-13.

To answer the objections raised by Vātsyāyana, a Buddhist philosopher, Vasubandhu (c. A.D. 410-490), composed three works, viz., *Vāda-vidhi*, *Vāda-vidhāna* and *Vāda-hrdaya*. But unfortunately all the works are lost⁸.

This philosopher however became also famous for propounding a fundamental doctrine of some Buddhists, the doctrine of idealism (Vijñānavāda), as a sophisticated philosophy. As to the advent of Vijñānavāda, Dr. Stcharbatsky says, "When Nāgārjuna's standpoint of extreme relativism was forsaken, the brothers Asaṅga and Vasubandhu took up the study of Nyāya logic and the work of its adaptation to the idealistic foundations of this philosophy"⁹.

As all the logical works of Vasubandhu has been lost, so the complete assessment of his view on logic is not possible at present. From the later works it is found that Vasubandhu opposing the nature of perception and inference, the number and nature of the members of syllogism recommended in the *Nyāya-sūtra*, gave new definitions of them¹⁰. He wrote his *Vāda-vidhi* challenging the laws regulating the debate as advocated by Gautama.

This dispute between the realism of the Nyāya school and the dogmatic idealism of the Vijñānavāda school of Buddhist philosophy went on. But it was the 5th century A.D. when India gave birth to her glorious philosopher-logician son, Dignāga. In his hand Buddhist idealism assumed a critical shape. Dignāga's *Pramāṇa-samuccaya*, perhaps the most outstanding one of his five works¹¹, shook the world of Indian logic. Notwithstanding the truth the Buddhists realized, Buddhist philosophy was suffering from insufficiencies of details in logic for their own to establish their realization. Now with Dignāga, Buddhist philosophy got the elixir of life. Dr. S.C. Vidyabhusana writes, "Both in matter and in manner his works marked a distinct departure from those of his predecessors. The keenness of his insight and the soundness of his critical acumen combined to stamp him with an individuality all his own. No praise seems too high for him. Indeed he may fittingly be styled as the first and last of Indian logicians"¹².

Pramāṇa-samuccaya is a logical work written in Anuṣṭubh metre. In this work Dignāga explains his own theories of Buddhist logic. By this Dignāga pushed the Buddhist philosophy in the duel ground where the Naiyāyikas were the chief opponents. He criticizes a Nyāya view : *Nyāya-sūtra* i. 1.12, enumerating the sense-organs, does not mention the mind, but the Naiyāyikas admit it as a separate sense-organ. In support of their view they say that the mind can unhesitatingly be admitted as a sense-organ because nowhere in the *Nyāya-sūtra* the view is contradicted. Now Dignāga says, well, if absence of contradiction means admission, there would have been no necessity at all of formulating this *sūtra* because the group of sense-organs as mentioned there has not been contradicted anywhere in the *Nyāya-sūtra*¹³. A few more objections like the above can be found which are nothing but trivial¹⁴.

The crucial points of dispute are the definitions of perception *pratyakṣa* and inference *anumāna* also with the definitions of probans (*hetu*) etc. given by Gautama. Refuting those Dignāga formulated fresh definitions of them¹⁵. Comparison (*upamāna*) and verbal testimony (*śabda*) are not separate instruments of valid knowledge in the Buddhist view¹⁶. It is Dignāga who for the first time draws attention to the theory of *Apoha*, i.e., the law of contradiction¹⁷. It contains the view opposite to 'the view of knowledge gathered in a direct way'. According to this *Apoha* theory, the law of cognizance is explained as "we can actively cognize or determine a thing only by opposing it to what it is not".

A spark which ignited the criticism in the realistic philosophy is Dignāga's 'definition of perception'. If the difference in the very basis appears too serious then that in the consecutive stages of development obviously turns to not only doctrinal dispute but also bitter relation in life. And exactly this happened in the later period. In the Nyāya philosophy being a realistic philosophy 'the knowledge resulting from sense-object contact' if also associated with terms is given the respect of nothing but perception and real knowledge. But reality, according to Dignāga, is inextricably involved in causal efficiency. A fire which burns and cooks is a real fire. A fire which is absent, which is imagined, which neither really burns nor cooks nor sheds any light, is an unreal fire. A reality which is stripped off from every relation and every construction, which has neither any position in time and space nor any characterizing quality, cannot be expressed because there is in it nothing to be expressed. If we express that sensation in words, the thing to be expressed must be attached with some kind of mental imagination which pushes it to the real of unreality. Representing this view Dignāga's definition of perception *pratyakṣam kalpanāpoḥam* has got the perpetuity.

In this way his observation of the truth rendered him into a perpetual enemy to the realistic group of philosophers. But whatever harm might have been to him, we have touched with a thrilling sensation of his revolutionary ideas. Unfortunately India could not protect any of the serious works of her worthy son from being lost for ever¹⁸.

Time rolled on. Then came the seventh century. During this intervening period the Naiyāyika philosophers exercised with their philosophy and logic but there was no one to put pen to paper. A Bhāradvāja Brahmin Uddyotakāra wrote an extensive commentary on Gautama's *Nyāya-sūtra* and Vātsyāyana's *Nyāya-bhāṣya* under the title of *Nyāya-vārtika*. The very purpose of composing the work, as the author himself declared, was to write an expository treatise on the *Nyāya-sūtra* to remove the veil of error cast by the quibblers¹⁹. These quibblers are none but Nāgārjuna, Vasubandhu, Dignāga chiefly and other Buddhist logicians²⁰.

It is quite natural that there are many things to be said for and against both the realists and the idealists. Uddyotakāra carried out his duties as a realist. But he is much more vociferous against the Buddhist doctrines. His temper can only be compared with that of Udayana.

The first thing to be mentioned is Uddyotakāra's discussion and refutation of Nāgārjuna's doctrine of voidness in *Nyāya-vārtika* under NS ii. 1. 8-19. In our world of cause and effect we cannot think of such a situation where there is no *pramāṇa*. The all-powerful *pramāṇa* can by no means be discarded. Only what he has done is that he has set the *pramāṇas* on an invulnerable foundation. The definitions of perception and inference given by Vasubandhu and those as given by Dignāga are vehemently criticized in *Nyāya-vārtika* under NS i. 1. 4-5. Dignāga in his *Pramāṇa-samuccaya* recorded a number of views regarding what actually is inferred in an inference and finally expressed his own view. All this is discussed and Dignāga's views are criticized in *Nyāya-vārtika* under NS i. 1. 5²¹. The definitions of proposition (*pratiṣṭhā*), probans (*hetu*) and example (*dṛṣṭānta*) given by Vasubandhu and Dignāga are refuted in *Nyāya-vārtika* under NS i. 1. 33-37. Uddyotakāra criticizes the law of debate as suggested by Vasubandhu, in *Nyāya-vārtika* under NS i. 2. 1. Apoha theory has been refuted by him in *Nyāya-vārtika* under NS ii. 2. 65. He also criticizes the denial of the evidences of comparison (*upamāna*) and verbal testimony (*sābda*) in *Nyāya-vārtika* under NS i. 1. 6-7. He is actually on a criticizing spree

to refute the Buddhist theory in which the whole is viewed as identified with its parts, in *Nyāya-vārtika* under NS ii. 1. 33. He also records a series of *pūrvapakṣa* arguments. The later Naiyāyika logicians took up this Buddhist theory by the expression 'identity of quality and the qualified'²².

The essence of the Buddhist philosophy lies in the doctrine of momentariness. In *Nyāya-vārtika* under NS iii. 2. 10-17, Uddyotakāra shows his erudition to refute the doctrine.

In *Nyāya-vārtika* under NS iv. 2. 26-37, Uddyotakāra criticizes the Buddhist theory of 'Denial of the external objects'. Some remarkable passages from this discussion may perhaps be quoted : "pleasure or pain is quite different from knowledge (*jñāna*), for pleasure or pain is an 'object to be cognised' (*grāhya*), while knowledge means its comprehension (*grahana*). The object cognised and the act of comprehension can never be identical. Secondly, the admission of illusory knowledge necessarily entails the acceptance of its opposite, i.e., valid knowledge also. An object which is never known rightly can also be never known falsely. Thirdly, one who does not admit the reality of any object other than mere consciousness will not be in a position either to defend one's own position or to refute that of other's, because one will not be able to communicate or explain anything to others with one's own mere consciousness which is intelligible to everyone else, just as the dream-experiences of a particular person are known to himself alone. To this, it may be replied that when a person defends his own thesis or refutes that of others he employs words and with the aid of 'consciousness as endowed with the word-form' (*śabdākāra-citta*) communication or explanation becomes possible, consciousness as endowed with the word-form is not unintelligible to others. The reply however does not fit in, for the Vijñānavādins do not admit the reality of *śabda* as an external object and hence, they cannot speak of consciousness as endowed with the word-form. Fourthly, on the claim that no external object apart from consciousness exists really, no distinction can be made between the states of dream and waking, for, in that case, objects will be equally non-existent always".

What Uddyotakāra says against the soul theory of the Buddhist has been more or less followed by the Nyāya logicians of later period²³.

Uddyotakāra criticized the Buddhists a lot. But he never mentioned the name of any particular work or philosopher except in a single case where the names of the two works *Vāda-vidhi* and *Vāda-vidhāna-tika* are mentioned. Though in most of the cases we come to know who that particular philosopher or logician is, he perhaps thought it would be sufficient to know that the refutation was directed against the Buddhist whoever he might be, an eminent one or an ordinary one.

Some argue that the mode of Uddyotakāra's refutation of the Buddhists is concerned more with verbal trickery than with true philosophical insight. It is found that while refuting a Buddhist theory he poses a number of alternative as to the opponent's theory, as if he is asking the opponent in front to answer those. But, he tries to show, not a single alternative is per missible and the only alternative which is found left does nothing but prove the Nyāya view. Probably this charge against Uddyotakāra is partly true. Though generally Uddyotakāra allows this kind of style and sometimes does not hesitate to distort the opponent's view, still in some cases he sticks to actual philosophical stand, which is found to be adopted continuously by the Nyāya logicians of later period.

But *Nyāya-vārtika* could not reign unchallenged in the field of Indian philosophy for a long time. In the middle of the 7th century challenges came from one of the famous Buddhist philosophers, Dharmakīrti.

This philosopher has written seven logical works, the celebrated "seven treatises", which have become the fundamental works for the study of logic in the Buddhist community and have more or less surpassed the works of Dignaga. Among the seven works the *Pramāṇa-vārtika* is the chief one, written in mnemonic verse; the next work *Pramāṇa-viniścaya* is an abridgment of the first, written in stanzas and prose; the *Nyāya-bindu* is a further abridgment of the same subject; *Hetu-bindu* is a short classification of logical reasons; *Sambandha-parikṣā* or an examination of the problem of relation is a small tract in stanzas with the author's own comment; *Vada-nyaya* is a treatise on the art of carrying on disputation and *Santānāntara-siddhi* is a treatise on the reality of other minds, directed against solipsism.

The *Pramāṇa-vārtika* was lost in India but we are lucky enough that the manuscript of this work has been discovered by Rahul Sankrityayana from Tibet.

In this pioneering work, Dharmakīrti discusses his own philosophy of idealism, generally by giving up the temptation of pricking the opponent's view. Though some refutations of the Nyāya views are found there, still its own remarkable philosophy and logic spontaneously inundated the castle of Nyāya philosophy, built by Uddyotakāra.

He criticizes the Nyaya view of the existence of God in the chapter called *Pramāṇasiddhi* (verse Nos. 12-18). The Nyāya view of perception is criticized in *Pratyakṣa* chapter (verse Nos. 136-40). The theory of generality (verse Nos. 145-48) and the theory of the existence of the whole also (verse Nos. 149-53) are refuted. The Nyāya definition of *Pakṣa* is refuted in *Parārthānumāna* chapter (verse Nos. 164-71). In the same chapter the definition of *pratijñā* also (verse Nos. 172-75) is criticized. But all these are matters of general logic.

"Although produced by a stimulus coming from an external object, but from an absolutely property-less pure object, is it indeed a reality? It is supposed to be absolutely stripped off from every vestige of an imaginative or constructive element. But is it not pure imagination?" No. "A single moment, just as an absolute particular, is not something representable in an image, it cannot be reached by our knowledge, that is to say, it is not something empirically real. But it is the element which imparts reality to all the others. It is the indispensable condition of all real and consistent knowledge. It is ~~trans~~transempirical, but it is not metaphysical, it is not a 'flower in the sky'. ... Dharmakīrti proposes to prove its reality by an experiment in the way of introspection. The metaphysical entities are metaphysical just because they are pure imagination, just because there is no point of reality, no moment of pure sensation to which they could be attached. They are 'unattainable as to place, time and sensible quality'. But this point and this sensation are present, directly or indirectly, in every act of empirical reality and empirical cognition. This we can indirectly prove by introspection. Dharmakīrti says - That sensation is something quite different from productive imagination -- can be proved just by introspection. Indeed, everyone knows that an image is something utterable (capable of coalescing with a name). Now, if we begin to state at a patch of colour and withdraw all our thoughts on whatsoever other (objects), if we thus reduce our consciousness to a condition of rigidity, (and become as though unconscious), this will be the condition of pure sensation. If we then, (awakening from that condition), begin to think, we notice a feeling (of

remembering) that we had an image (of a patch of colour before us), but we did not notice it whilst we were in the foregoing condition, (we could not name it) because it was pure sensation"²⁴. This coruscative observation has given Dharmakīrti immortality in the history of Indian philosophy.

*sahopalambhaniyamād abhedo nīlataddhiyoh/bhedaśca bhrāntivijñānair dṛṣyaten-dāvivādvaye*²⁵ //, a verse of *Pramāṇa-viniścaya* is one of the most remarkable representation of the idealistic philosophy of Dharmakīrti. Practically there is no opponent philosopher who did not criticize this verse.

Even then Dharmakīrti was not unaware of the danger to which Idealism may ultimately lead in the shape of its direct consequence, solipsism. He therefore singled out this problem from his great work and devoted to it a special tract under the title *Santānāntara-siddhi*, i.e., Establishment of the existence of the other minds. This work contains a verification of the whole of Dharmakīrti's epistemology in its application to a special complicated case. Dharmakīrti makes a gift to us of this brilliant piece of document narrating the realistic and Buddhist position in a problematic matter in the day.

He however did not want to discuss about a metaphysical entity, which is a compulsory matter of discussion for the Nyāya logicians. It is said that Dharmakīrti, when studying under Iśvarasena wrote the chapter on Buddhology in *Pramāṇa-vārtika*. But this religious part was dropped in all the other treatises and he himself most emphatically and clearly expresses his opinion in the closing passage of *Santānāntara-siddhi*, "... Our knowledge being limited to experience, we neither think nor speak out anything definite about Him, we can neither assert nor deny His existence"²⁶.

For a century, from Dharmakīrti's time down to the 1st quarter of the 8th century, Buddhist philosophy was conspicuous by the absence of any remarkable original work due to absence of any talented philosopher in their school. At last a brilliant composition from the Buddhist school came to light. It is the *Tattvasaṃgraha*. Its author Śāntarakṣita (A.D. 705-65) was a professor at Nalanda. He visited Tibet at the invitation of king Khri-sron deu-tsan (8th cent.). The king with the assistance of Śāntarakṣita built in 749 A.D. the monastery of Sam-ye in Tibet, and Śāntarakṣita was its first abbot. It is sure that *Tattvasaṃgraha* was composed before its author had gone to Tibet. He as elaborately explains the Buddhist doctrines of his own line as he vehemently criticizes the Nyāya views.

Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇa-vārtika* was then inaccessible. The *Tattvasaṃgraha* throws literally a flood of light on Buddhist metaphysics of the Sautrantika-Yogacara school and logic and epistemology. The most remarkable feature of this work is its reproduction of the views of scholars who otherwise would have remained in perfect oblivion. Kamalaśīla gives the names of the authors and quotes from them...."²⁷

From the study of this work along with Uddyotakāra's *Nyāya-vārtika* and Kumārila's works one can fruitfully gather some ideas about the philosophical activities of the centuries. The attack on realism, on the Soul theory and on the infallibility of the Vedas, provoked simultaneously the Nyaya, and Kumarila's Mīmamsa schools. This counter-criticisms of the orthodox stalwarts succeeded in undermining the prestige of the Buddhist monastery. But the Buddhists were not supine and reacted with vigour and nerve. The *Tattvasaṃgraha* preeminently represents this phase of the Buddhist reaction. In fact, Dharmakīrti started to criticize directly the Mīmāṃsā school and as a result Kumārila tried

to take revenge on the Buddhists. Naturally it was not possible for Śāntarakṣita and his disciple Kamalaśīla, to keep silence against Kumāṛila's criticism.

We are here concerned with the conflict between the Nyāya and the Buddhist. Therefore from Śāntarakṣita's criticism of the Nyāya views, particularly of Uddyotakāra, it appears that as Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla (c. A.D. 750) accepted Sautrāntika view in which the external object exists (though this existence can be proved only by inference), it has been easier for them to criticize the realist's objections.

In *Tattvasaṃgraha*, Uddyotakāra's views on the part and the whole (verse Nos. 560-62, 583, 592-98), on momentariness (verse Nos. 370-84, 388, 466-67, 471-75), on *Apoha* (verse Nos. 981-99, 1184- 99), and on Soul (verse Nos. 180-84, 195-216, 220) are criticised.

There were other famous logicians also in the intervening period. They were Bhāvivikta, Aviddhakārṇa and Śāṅkarasvāmin²⁸. Bhāvivikta may be prior to Uddyotakāra. Bhāvivikta's *Bhāṣyaṭīkā* and Aviddhakārṇa's *Tattvaṭīkā* are known to us only by name. Anyway, those Naiyāyika logicians were "pillars" of the system. Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla naturally attacked them. Many minor views of these scholars are found mentioned and criticised in *Tattvasaṃgraha* and *Pañjikā*.

Here one among many of the objections can be mentioned to assess Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla as to how far the objection was justified. What we call existence, they are never tired of repeating, is always related to an action. 'Existence is work' says Śāntarakṣita. It is an anthropomorphic illusion to suppose that a thing can exist only, exist placidly, exist without acting, and then, as it were, suddenly rise and produce an action. Whatsoever exists is always acting. The conclusion that whatsoever really exists is a cause is urged upon the Buddhist by his definition of existence quoted above. Existence, real existence, is nothing but efficiency. Consequently what is non-efficient, or what is a non-cause, does not exist. 'A non-cause', says Uddyotakāra, addressing himself to the Buddhist, 'is double, it is for you either something non-existing or something change less'. Kamalaśīla corrects this statement of Uddyotakāra and accuses him of not sufficiently knowing the theory of his adversaries, 'because', says he, 'those Buddhists who are students of logic maintain that a non-cause is necessarily a non-reality'. This means that to be a real is nothing but to be a cause, whatsoever exists is necessarily a cause.

The growth and development of the ideas and the sentiments of these two different groups of philosophers have been reflected in a rich literature which can make the subject extremely interesting.

Now with Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, the Buddhist philosophy is in a safe situation, but on the contrary the Nyāya philosophy was rather pushed to the wall without any brilliant logical production up to the middle of the 9th century from the time of Uddyotakāra. In this situation, Vācaspati Miśra (c. A.D. 841)²⁹, a Brahmin logician wrote an elaborate gloss on the *Nyāya-vārtika* under the title *Nyāya-vārtika-tātparyā-ṭīkā*.

In the writing of Vācaspati we find his exemplary observation of the logical nuances which can rarely be found in others. He possessed the rare qualities of erudition and faithfulness of representing the opponent's views. As a Nyāya exponent he followed Uddyotakāra in refuting the Buddhist doctrines but not always without some differences of opinion. His refutation is much more deep and subtle in comparison with Uddyotakāra's

refutation, being pungent and aggressive. Under NS i. 1. 4-5, Tīka shows us Vācaspati's clear understanding about the nature of the Buddhist perception and inference.

Vācaspati quotes the relevant verses of Dignāga while explaining Uddyotakāra's refutation of Dignāga. He found the fresh scope of refuting Dharmakīrti's views of perception and others. He quoted verses of *Pramāṇa-vārtika* and *Pramāṇa-viniścaya*³⁰. The verse of *Tattvasamgraha* is found to have been quoted in *Tīkā* but it seems that Vācaspati did not give much importance to that text.

Up to the time before Vācaspati, God was not so much considered to be a matter of dispute in debate with the Buddhists. But starting with him, to prove or to refute the existence of God became a prestige issue.

Generally it is found that a philosopher having faith in a certain philosophical system cannot show his adherence to another philosophical system. When a philosopher in course of explaining seeks the permanent justification of the doctrine containing in the philosophy of his own like and tries to adopt those in thought and practice, it is very difficult for him to make his mind agree to give importance to another system of philosophy. Vācaspati is rather a conspicuous exception. He wrote three commentaries, *Nyāya-vārtika-tātparyatīkā* on Nyāya philosophy, *Sāṃkhya-tattva-kaumudī* on Sāṃkhya philosophy and *Bhāmātī* on Vedānta philosophy. We do not know which one of them he preferred. But in all the three commentaries, his coruscative explanation of the different doctrines makes us believe that none, in actuality, is negligible. Now even after a long journey we are struck with doubt if the objections against the Buddhist philosophy actually forbid us to believe in it.

Now the objections against the Buddhists came from a new direction -- Kashmir. After Vācaspati there flourished another talented Nyāya logician named Jayanta Bhaṭṭa (A.D. 840-900) who was the younger contemporary of Vācaspati. He wrote an independent commentary on the *Nyāya-sūtra*, called *Nyāya-mañjarī*.

He was an orthodox Brahmin who zealously defended the authority of the Vedas and saw the refutation of Buddhism as a religious cause. Yet he was no fanatic. He was capable of retaining his sense of humour under adversity. He tells us that as he writes *Nyāya-mañjarī* he is being held prisoner in a cave and "I have beguiled my days here by this diversion of writing a book"³¹. A rare virtue which is indicative of true greatness is his humility in declaring that he could lay no claim to originality³².

Many of the Buddhist views are mentioned and refuted in *Nyāya-mañjarī*, such as, there are only two instruments of valid knowledge, perception is conceptual construction which is free from determination by the imagination and is non-illusory³³. *Apoha*, momentariness, two theories of illusion -- *asaṃkhyātī* (of the Madhyamikas) and *ātmakhyātī* (of the Vijñānavādins), etc. Among these the Buddhist theory of momentariness exhausted Jayanta's maximum energy.

It is needless to say that Dharmakīrti among the Buddhists is no doubt the main opponent of Jayanta. Numerous verses from Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇa-vārtika* have been quoted and refuted in *Nyāya-mañjarī*. Dignāga also is occasionally mentioned. Dharmottara (c. A.D. 829) also is criticised by Jayanta in a few places³⁴.

It is a perpetual matter of dispute whether knowledge is like the eye or a candle. The philosophical discussion, however, about knowledge has been divided into two groups on

the basis of these two differences. And this stretched long. Naturally to refute the Vijñānavādins we find this kind of discussion made in a great detail in *Nyāya-mañjarī*.

After Dharmakīrti, the Mīmāṃsā school turned up against the Buddhists. Kumārila (c. 8th cent.) a great Mīmāṃsaka scholar attained great success in refuting them and establishing his opinion. But it was a fact for the Naiyāyikas that an old enemy is vanquished by a new enemy.

Prabhākara (c. late 8th cent.) another strong Mīmāṃsaka scholar played the same role. So the Naiyāyika scholars thought it necessary to stop the group of these new enemies.

Properly going through *Nyāya-mañjarī*, it however appears that Jayanta was also attentive to the refutation of the Mimamsa views of Kumārila as well as of Prabhākara. Actually with the decline of Buddhism in India the doctrinal and logical conflict was shifted to between the Nyāya and the Mīmāṃsā schools of philosophy. It will not be improper to say that Jayanta accelerated the criticism against the Mīmāṃsā school though it is found to have been started long before by Uddyotakāra and rather prominently by Vācaspati. In fact, Jayanta had to protect the Nyāya philosophy from the attack not only of the Buddhists but also of different groups of other philosophers. In spite of this Jayanta has retained his renown by faithfully representing the opponent's views.

Over and above, the activities of the Buddhists are not consistent with what they say. That is why Jayanta also was very much aggressive against them. He says: "You, Bauddhas, hold that there is no soul, yet you construct *caityas* (towers) to enjoy pleasure in paradise after death; you say that everything is momentary; yet you build monasteries with the hope that they will last for centuries; and you say that the world is void, yet you teach that wealth should be given to spiritual guides. What a strange character, the Bauddhas possess, they are verily a monument of conceit"³⁵.

In the 10th century the Nyāya system of philosophy is divided into two courses. One flowed in the old line and the other course started with Bhāsarvajña. To put it clearly, Bhāsarvajña was the first known proponent of a number of doctrines which diverge boldly from the accepted traditional views. A Kashmirian like Jayanta, Bhāsarvajña must have been flourished contemporaneously with him (c. A.D. 860-920).

Nyāyabhūṣaṇa is a monumental work composed by him. It is an auto-commentary of *Nyāyasāra*. It was supposed to be the lost for a long time, but it is a miracle that perhaps the only manuscript of *Nyāyabhūṣaṇa* has been suddenly discovered from the personal custody of Satya Swarup Shastri, in 1959.

Profuse quotations and verses from Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇa-vārtika* and Prajñākara's *Pramāṇa-vārtika-alamkāra* are found in this work. He criticizes the views of Nāgārjuna, Vasubandhu, Dignāga, Dharmakīrti, Prajñākara, Dharmottara, Śāntarakṣita, Kamalaśīla, Kaṇagomin and many others. Prajñākara (c. A.D. 940) started the philosophical school of interpretation of the *Pramāṇa-vārtika*. He wrote a voluminous commentary on *Pramāṇa-vārtika* under the title *Pramāṇa-vārtika-alamkāra*.

Now appeared in the field a great Buddhist scholar named Jñānaśrīmitra. He was associated with the Vikramasīlā mahāvihāra which was established by the famous Buddhist emperor Dharmapāla (c. A.D. 770-810) and flourished under the liberal patronage of his successors. In the 11th century, we find it in the form of an international University attracting scholars from other parts of Asia. All the Śāstras were taught in it. Buddhism

received priority among them. There were six great Erudites there. Four of them were called keepers of the four gates -- Dvārapaṇḍitas of the seat of learning that was the mahāvihāra and the two others, still greater, were called the two "Great Pillars" of wisdom. We find Jñānaśrimitra as the second Great Pillar of this University. He tried to revive the Buddhist philosophy against the attack of the Nyāya logic.

He criticizes the views of Trilocana and his disciple Vācaspati, Bhāsarvajña and a few other Naiyāyika logicians with the utmost strength of his intellectuality. His writing on the one hand ascends the acme of intellectual analysis and on the other hand unveils the background of Udayana's arguments. Among those who were refuted by him, Trilocana was a dominant figure between Kamalaśīla and Vācaspati to receive the special attention of Jñānaśrī³⁶. Anyway, Jñānaśrī was more concerned with the views of Bhāsarvajña, a strong opponent who flourished immediately before him. It is known that Trilocana composed a work under the title *Nyāya-prakīrnaka*. We do not know whether this work is the same as the *Nyāya-bhāṣya-ṭīka*, composed by him. One *Nyāya-māñjarī* also was attributed to him. But unfortunately we do not find any of his works.

Vittoka³⁷ must have been a Nyaya author of considerable importance. His views on Īśvaravāda alone have been recorded by Jñānaśrī and his disciple Ratnakīrti. It seems that he wrote a treatise on Īśvara.

Śātānanda³⁸ is the last Naiyāyika whose view on Īśvara alone has been quoted by Jñānaśrimitra.

It appears from his writing that being a teacher at Nalanda, Jñānaśrī directly realized the insult coming from the Nyāya logicians. But though Jayanta and Bhāsarvajña criticized the Buddhist doctrines very strongly, the warmth of opposition cannot be realized on their body. But Jñānaśrī and after him Udayana boiled over the dispute. They directly perceived the heat of hostility³⁹.

The biggest tract composed by him is on momentariness. To establish the theory of momentariness, the verse: *yat sat tat kṣaṇikam yathā jaladharaḥ santaśca bhāvā imelsattā śaktirihārthakarmanimiteḥ siddheṣu siddhā na sa/nāpyekaiva vidhānyadāpi parakṛṇnaiva kriyā vā bhaved/dvedhāpi kṣaṇabhaṅgasamgatirataḥ sādhye ca viśrāmyati*!! was emanated from his pen and got the honour of fulcrum of the theory. *Apoha*, *anupalabdhi* and invariable concomitance (*vyāpti*) were discussed in a great detail. On God, Jñānaśrī made such a heating discussion under the title *Īśvaravāda*, that practically this aroused in Udayana's writing an assaulting attitude, later.

Ratnakīrti, a worthy disciple of Jñānaśrimitra, in his ten small treatises on different topics, tried to refute the Nyāya philosophy. He gave more attention to refute Trilocana and Vācaspati rather than Bhāsarvajña. A close scrutiny reveals that Ratnakīrti has summarized the works of his *guru* in many cases and the debt has also been eloquently acknowledged. But the fatal thing that Ratnakīrti did, is his writing a treatise *Santānāntara-dūṣanam* and it is a great risk of inviting solipsism which scared Dharmakīrti and led him write *Santānāntarasiddhi*. But Ratnakīrti was daring enough to compose a work refuting the crucial view of their honoured-by-all preceptor.

Jñānaśrimitra made his last try to ameliorate the injuries inflicted by Vācaspati and Bhāsarvajña on the Buddhist philosophy, but their philosophy again got a mortal hurt, when a Hindu logician Udayana (A.D. 984) composed two pungent works under the titles *Nyāya-kusumāñjali* and *Ātmatattvaviveka*.

The fundamental philosophy of momentariness and the denial of the existence of God are challenged in these two works, *Ātmatattvaviveka* is mainly devoted to the refutation of the Buddhist doctrines of Soul. It criticizes several Buddhist views like those of Universal flux, *Apoha*, Universals, unity of knowledge and its object. *Citrādvaita*, *Vijñānavāda*, identity of the quality and the qualified, self as knowledge alone, *Īśvaravāda*, *Sarvajñavāda*, etc. In most of the topics Jñānasrimitra's works supply the *pūrvapakṣa*. Jñānasrimitra has been quoted and referred to by name. Everything is obviously to prove the existence of God. It can humorously be said here that God will himself intend to exist no more, if He comes to know that his existence depends on so much painstaking efforts done in *Ātmatattvaviveka*. In fact, Jñānasrī gave a heavy jerk to the Nyāya view of the existence of God as for which Udayana had to compose a separate work against that. In the practical life the bitterness travelled so penetratively between the Buddhists and the Naiyāyikas that a controversy was decided (So goes the story) even by way of jumping from a palm tree. Udayana was very much proud of thinking himself as a protector of God. Here is his utterance: "Oh Lord, you have been puffed up with pride as you are now illustrious (when I have made you safe after defeating the Buddhists) and dare ignore me. But (be sure) when the Buddhists come again, your existence will depend upon me"⁴⁰.

The continuous hurt inflicted by the Nyāya logicians made the Buddhist philosophy helpless to survive in the common mind. It is also a point that after Jñānasrimitra there was no Buddhist scholar who could efficiently hold up their philosophy. Many works undoubtedly were composed but those lacked sharpness of original thinking⁴¹. In fact, from the 10th century the struggle for existence of the Buddhists in India due to Muslim aggression over the Buddhist education centres was the main cause of unproductiveness of a brilliant philosophical literature for them. But the gradual fall of Buddhism in India was noticed much before. Dr. Stcherbatsky writes, "Notwithstanding the great scope and success of his propaganda he (Dharmakīrti) could only retard, but not stop the process of decay which befell Buddhism on its native soil. Buddhism in India was doomed. The most talented propagandist could not change the run of history. The time of Kumāṛila and Śaṅkarācārya, the great champions of Brahmanical revival and opponents of Buddhism, was approaching. Tradition represents Dharmakīrti as having combated them in public disputations and having been victorious. But this is only an after-thought and a pious desire on the part of his followers. At the same time it is an indirect confession that these great Brahmin teachers had met with no Dharmakīrti to oppose them"⁴².

But in the Nyāya line two commentaries at least on Udayana's *Ātmatattvaviveka* (alias *Bauddha-dhikkāra*), one *Bauddha-dhikkāra-tika* by Śaṅkara Miśra (A.D. 1450) and the other *Bauddha-dhikkāra-śiromaṇi* by Raghunātha Śiromaṇi (A.D. 1477-1547) extinguished the last hope of the Buddhists to escape from the trap of the Nyāya logic.

In Śaṅkara Miśra's *Vāḍḍivinoda* Jñānasrī's name is found in the list of the foremost Buddhist logicians. But during Śaṅkara's time the Buddhist works lost much of their importance as they were historical documents rather than part and parcel of living faith in India. NOTES

NOTES

- 1 Brahmajala-sutta : vide a History of Indian Logic, pp.227-29
Katha-vatthu : vide -do- pp. 234-40
Upanisads : vide -do- pp. 3

- 2 2.NS iv. 2.6-11

- 3 NS iii. 2.10-17
- 4 NS iv. 2.26-37
- 5 NS iv. 1.37-40
- 6 H. Nakamura gives the date of Nagarjuna as c. 150-250 A.D. vide *Indian Buddhism*, p. 235
- 7 .BL, I, p.22
- 8 For informative notes vide BL, I, pp. 29-30
- 9 BL, I, p. 29
- 10 Definition of perception : *tatorthat vijñānam pratyakṣam*, i.e., Perception is cognition coming from that same object.
Definition of inference : *nantariyakartha-darśanam tadvido'numānam*, i.e., Inference is the cognition of a thing which is invariably concomitant on the part of one who knows the said concomitance. Definition of thesis : *sādhyabhidhanam pratijñā*, i.e., Thesis is the mention of the probandum. Definition of probans : *heturvipakṣad viśeṣaḥ*, i.e., Probans is that which is disconnected from where the probandum is known to be absent.
- 11 *Pramāṇa-samuccaya* (Tib. *Tshad-ma Kun-ias btus-pa*), *Nyāya-praveśa* (Tib. *Tshad-ma rigs-par 'jug-pa'i sgo*), *Hetu-cakra-hamaru* (Tib. *gTan-tshigs-kyi 'khor-lo gtan-la dbab-pa*), *Alambanaparikṣa* (Tib. *dMigs-pa brtag-pa*) and *Trikāla-parikṣa* (Tib. *Dus gsum brtag-pa*).
- 12 *A History of Indian Logic*, p. 270
- 13 *na sukhādi prameyam va mano vastvīndriyāntaram/ anisēdhad upattam ced anyendriyārutam vrtha//*
Quoted in NVTT, vide *Catur.* pp. 235-6
- 14 "Dignāga laughs at Vātsyāyana by saying that the Naiyāyika (Aksapada) takes pride in borrowing his definition of perception (*pratyakṣa*) from the Sūtra of the Vaiśeṣikas, viz., that perception is knowledge which arises from the intercourse of the soul with the mind, the mind with a sense-organ, and the sense-organ with its object. The Naiyāyika is however careful not to connect his perception with generality (*sāmānya*), particularity (*viśeṣa*), substance (*dravya*), quality (*guṇa*) and action (*Karma*) on which, as pointed out by Dignāga, the Vaiśeṣika's intercourse is dependent. Oh ! what a strange consistency".
A History of Indian Logic, p. 279
- 15 Definition of perception : *pratyakṣam kalpanāpodham*, i.e., perception is that which is free from mental construction. Definition of inference : *anumeye'tha tattulye sādabhavo nastita'sati*, i.e., Inference is that which is present in the subject of inference and also in things similar to it and which is absent from where the inferable property is non-existent. Definition of probans : *grahyadharmastādamsena vyapto hetuḥ*.
- 16 The controversy regarding comparison as a separate instrument of valid knowledge is very ancient. We find certain references of this in *Nyāya-manjari* and *Nyāya-Kusumanjali*. e.g., NM, pp. 129-30; NKM, pp. 193-204
G. Jha in his 'The Nyāyasūtras of Gautama' (fn. p. 198) says : In chapter IV of his *Pramāṇa-samuccaya* Dignāga objects to *upamāna* as a separate instrument of cognition; he includes it under perception. Uddyotakara says that comparison does not differ from perception and word. (But *āgama* is not admitted as a separate instrument of valid knowledge by the Buddhists.) (vide *Catur.*, p. 356). Vasubandhu accepted *āgama* as a separate instrument of valid knowledge. (vide BL I, fn. p. 72)
Stcherbatsky : The Buddhists from the time of Dignāga fall in line with the Vaiśeṣikas. They admit only two different sources of knowledge, which they call perception and inference. Verbal testimony and reasoning by analogy is for them included in inference. (BL, I, p. 72)
Though the Vaiśeṣikas and the Buddhists advocate for two instruments of valid knowledge, perception and inference, still the Naiyāyikas are not so much objectionary towards the Vaiśeṣikas as they are against the Buddhists. Only it was Udayana who gave a strong objection to the theory of two 'instruments of valid knowledge' of the Vaiśeṣikas.
- 17 .Chapter V of *Pramāṇa-samuccaya* contains the doctrine of *Apoha*.
- 18 Fragments from Dignāga have been found in several logical texts of Indian philosophy. Besides, also a large number of reconstruction works of Dignāga's texts has been done by a number of scholars of different countries. Translations in different languages from the extant Chinese and Tibetan translations are also available. vide *The Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies*, vol I, pp. 51-55

- 19 kutarkikajnananivrttihetuh karisyate tasya maya nibandhah//
NV, vide Catur., P. 6
- 20 kutarkikairdignagaprabhrtibhih.
NVTT. vide Catur., p. 23
- 21 Actual verses of Dignaga's *Pramana-samuccaya* (chap. II) are found quoted in VTT on NS i.1.5.
- 22 Udayana in his third chapter of his *Atmatattvaviveka* discusses, in a great detail, the Buddhist view of quality and qualified.
- 23 Recognition is considered by Uddyotakara as a strong ground to establish the existence of soul. It is seen that recognition is a strong argument in *Nyaya-manjari*. (Ref. NM, pt. II, p. 11). In NKM (I.15) also we find:
nanyadrstam smaratyanyo naikam bhutamapakramat/
vasanasamkramo nasti na ca gatyantaram sthira//
Remembrance also a ground which has been shown repeatedly in favour of a permanent soul.
In this connection it should be mentioned that though Uddyotakara elaborately refutes this ancient view that rejects the reality of the soul, Uddyotakara himself does not admit that such a view was true to the real teachings of the Buddha.
- 24 BL, I, pp. 150-1
- 25 The first half of the verse found in *Pramana-viniscaya*. The Tib. version runs as follows : lhan-cig dmigs-pa nes-pa'i phyir/snon dan de blo gzan ma yin/ (mDo xcv II. fol. 263b). But the second half is not found in verse form though the idea contained there has been clarified in prose. The verse form is found in *Pramana-vartika*.
- 26 BL, I, p. 39
- 27 vide Preface of *Tattvasamgraha*.
- 28 Manorathanandin in his *Pramanavartika-vrtti* mentions one Sankarasvamin as acariya whose view was criticised by Dharmakirti. vide *Pramana-vartika*, p. 143
In *Nyayamanjari-granthi-bhanga*, Cakradhara mentions Sankarasvamin as a commentator of *Nyaya-bhasya*. of. Sankarasvami nyayabhasyatikakrt, vide NM(S), II, p. 146
- 29 The latest researches seem to justify the Saka era theory and place Vacaspati in 976 A.D. (Date of Vacaspati Misra and Udayanacarya - D.C. Bhattacharya, *Jha Research Institute Journal*, vol. II, pp. 349-56.)
vide *Ratnakirtinibandhavalī*, Introduction p.21 f.
- 30 Numerous verses of *Pramana-vartika* are found quoted.
arthopayoge'pi punah smartam sabdanuyojanam/
aksadhiryadyapekseta so'rtho vyavahito bhavet//
yah pragajanako buddherupayogavisesatah/
sa pascadapi tena syadaksapaye'pi netradhih//
are the verses of *Pramana-viniscaya* quoted under NS i.1.4. These can be identified with the Tibetan translation of the text : don ni ne-bar sbyor-ba na'n/ gzan yan sgra sbyor dran-pa la/ gal-te dban-po'i blo lto na/ don de chod-par 'gyur-ba yin/ gan snon blo-yi skyed-byed min/ ner sbyor khyad-par med-pa'i phyir/ de ni phis kyan 'gyur tes na/ don med na yan mig blor 'gyur// (Tshad-ma mam-par nes-pa, mDo xcv. II. fol. 253a)
- 31 grantharacanavinodadiha hi maya vasarah gamitah. NM(S), II, p.147
- 32 kuto va nutanam vastu vayanī utpreksitum ksamah/
vacovinyasavaicitramatram atra vicaryatam// NM(S), I, p.5
na hiyam kavibhih purvairadrastam suksmadarsibhih/
sakta tmamapi drastum matimama tapasvini// NM(S), II, p.147
33. kalpanapodham abhramant pratyaksam.
- 34 A History of Indian Logic, p. 150. vide also NM(S), I, pp. 91, 159. Those were identified also by Cakradhara in his *Nyayamanjari-granthi-bhanga*.
- 35 nasyatma phalabhogamatramatha ca svargaya caityarccanam/
samskaraḥ kṣanika yugasthitibhṛtścaite viharah kṛtāh/
sarvaṃ sunyamidaṃ vasuṇi gurave dehiti cadisyate/
bauddhanam caritaṃ kimanyadiyati dambhasya bhumih para//
NM, II, p. 39

- 36 A.L. Thakur, "The Naiyayika Trilocana as a teacher of Vacaspati", *Indian Culture* 14, 1947, 36-40.
A.L. Thakur, "Nyaya-manjari of Guru Trilocana - a forgotten work", *Journal of Bihar and Orissa Research Society (Patna)* 41, 1955, 507-11.
Collections of different views of Trilocana from the works of Jnanasri and others can be a valuable contribution to the Indian philosophical studies.
- 37 Vitoka is mentioned several times in Isvaravada of Jnanasri. vide *Jnanasrimitranibandhavalī*, pp. 235, 237, 242-3, 255, 260. Also vide *Ratnakirtinibandhavalī*, p. 47
- 38 "The name of this scholar does not actually occur in these works. Jnanasrimitra introduces his views as those of a 'a certain scholar' (aparah) (Isvaravada, pp. 237, 255). The marginal notes supply the lacuna. Now what we could gather about this scholar is this : Satananda wrote some tract on Nyaya philosophy in which the refutation of the Buddhist position with regard to Isvara occurred. The five arguments put against the Buddhist position by him have been proved ineffective in the Isvaravada.
Jnanasrimitra-nibandhavalī, Introduction, p. 22.
- 39 "... Jnanasrimitra had to face a number of scholars who wielded considerable importance at his time. Many important texts he consulted are now lost and perhaps irreparably. In the Nyaya system the works of highest importance only have been preserved. Those intervening between two such works are lost. Sometimes their views were quoted anonymously in later works. Thus some of the older views on Isvara can now be traced in Nyaya-kusumanjali of Udayana. But the Buddhist and Jaina authors have preserved passages from ancient masters with proper reference to their authors. Jnanasrimitra is responsible for preserving actual passages from the works of many important scholars that came between Dharmakīrti and Udayana and thus his Nibandhas became an important document to a student of Indian Logic".
Jnanasrimitra-nibandhavalī, Introduction, pp. 22-23.
- 40 .aisvaryamadamatā san atmanamavamanayase/
punarbaudhe samayate madadhina tava sthitiḥ//
- 41 In the 11th century the Buddhists, Jnanasribhadra, Ratnakaraśanti, Yamari, Sankarananda contributed voluminous writing on Buddhist thought and logic. In the Nyaya line from the beginning of the 13th century the Naiyayika logicians were much engaged with the philosophy of the New school of Nyaya logic, i.e., with Tallvacintamani of Gangesa.

42 BL, I, p. 35

ABBREVIATIONS

BL - Buddhist Logic.

Catur. - Caturgranthika.

NKM - Nyayakusumanjali.

NM - Nyayamanjari, Ed. S. Sukla.

NM(S) - Nyayamanjari, Sampurnananda Sanskrita Visvavidyalaya ed.

NS - Nyaya-sutra.

NV - Nyaya-vartika.

NVTT - Nyayavartika-tatparya-tika.

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