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Usage of the term 'theory of mind' (ToM) has exploded across fields ranging from developmental psychology to social neuroscience and psychiatry research. However, its meaning is often vague and inconsistent, its biological bases are a subject of debate, and the methods used to study it are highly heterogeneous. Most crucially, its original definition does not permit easy downward translation to more basic processes such as those studied by behavioral neuroscience, leaving the interpretation of neuroimaging results opaque. We argue for a reformulation of ToM through a systematic two-stage approach, beginning with a deconstruction of the construct into a comprehensive set of basic component processes, followed by a complementary reconstruction from which a scientifically tractable concept of ToM can be recovered.
Inferring the beliefs, desires, and intentions of other people (?theory of mind,? ToM) requires specialized psychological processes that represent the minds of others as distinct from our own [1?3]. ToM is engaged ubiquitously in our everyday social behavior and features a specific developmental trajectory [4] that is notably delayed in children with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) [5, 6]. In healthy individuals, model-based analyses of social learning and decision-making have successfully elucidated specific computational components of ToM processing [7?11]. However, the use of this approach to study ToM impairment in ASD has been extremely limited [10, 12]. To better characterize specific ToM impairment in ASD, we developed a novel learning task and applied model-based analyses in high-functioning adults with ASD and matched healthy controls. After completing a charitable donation task, participants performed a ?mentalizer? task in which they observed another person (the agent) complete the same charity task. The mentalizer task probed the participants? ability to acquire and use ToM representations. To accurately predict agent behavior, participants needed to dynamically track the agent?s beliefs (true or false) about an experimental context that varied over time and use that information to infer the agent?s intentions from their actions. ASD participants were specifically impaired at using their estimates of agent belief to learn agent intentions, though their ability to track agent belief was intact and their reasoning about belief and intentions was rational. Furthermore, model parameters correlated with aspects of social functioning, e.g., ADOS severity scores [13]. Together, these results identify novel, and more specific, targets for future research.
Humans are exceedingly social animals, but the neural underpinnings of social cognition and behavior are not well understood. Studies in humans and other primates have pointed to several structures that play a key role in guiding social behaviors: the amygdala, ventromedial frontal cortices, and right somatosensory-related cortex, among others. These structures appear to mediate between perceptual representations of socially relevant stimuli, such as the sight of conspecifics, and retrieval of knowledge (or elicitation of behaviors) that such stimuli can trigger. Current debates concern the extent to which social cognition draws upon processing specialized for social information, and the relative contributions made to social cognition by innate and acquired knowledge.