Displaying 1 - 11 of 11
<p>This essay examines the consequences of Said's critique of orientalism for Tibetan studies, particularly in relation to Lopez's claim that we are all "prisoners of Shangrila." The paper takes up this critique in relation to Lopez's treatment of the present Dalai Lama, arguing that although his critique is useful, it exaggerates the scope and power of orientalism, and in the process ends up de-historicizing and reifying Tibetan culture into a closed totality that either remains unchanged or becomes debased through the intervention of the West. This, the essay argues, leaves little room for alternatives to orientalism, both in the West and among Tibetans, and thus ends up repeating the exclusionary gesture that this critique had sought to debunk. (Than Garson 2005-09-22)</p>
<p>This chapter looks at the question of whether traditional Buddhist typologies of mind are commensurable with the Western concept of emotion. The concept of emotion is, as the author notes, complex and has been the subject of multiple competing theories coming from Plato, Aristotle, William James, and others. The various views assume their own frameworks for defining emotion with some emphasizing their mental aspect and others their physicality. While traditional Buddhists certainly experience emotions and have words for particular emotions, the concept of emotion itself is absent in Buddhist typologies of the mind. The author describes the traditional understanding of mind according the Buddhist point of view (specifically from the Abhidharma tradition), noting the distinction between (1) the mind (or primary mental states; Sanskrit: citta; Tibetan: sems) and (2) mental factors (secondary mental states that accompany primary states of mind; Sanskrit: caita; Tibetan: sems 'byung). In general, the mind and mental factors operate together to make for full-blown cognition of objects and include, amongst other things, a feeling tone, a directedness and awareness of objects, and an intention. A mind may be virtuous, non-virtuous, or neutral. Some mental states, both virtuous and non-virtuous, can be thought of as emotions, although, as the author points out, it can become problematic to map English words for certain types of emotions onto Buddhist mental states. From the Buddhist perspective, compassion, for example, can- at certain instances- be an immediate feeling that arises in response to suffering, and in this way it possesses the characteristics often associated with emotions. However, compassion is also thought of as a mental state that has been developed gradually through spiritual practice. Unless the concept of emotion is extended, the latter understanding of compassion (i.e. compassion as a cultivated mental state) can not be thought of as an emotion. In the end, the author concludes the Buddhist and Western typologies of the mind are incommensurable. However, this does not mean that the experiences of traditional Buddhists and the experiences of those with other mental typologies are significantly different. English words for emotion can be used intelligibly to <em>describe</em> Buddhist mental states as long as the difficulties inherent in such translations are recognized. (Zach Rowinski 2004-12-29)</p>
<p>Despite the fact that the various Tibetan Buddhist traditions developed substantive ethical systems on the personal, interpersonal and social levels, they did not develop systematic theoretical reflections on the nature and scope of ethics. Precisely because very little attention is devoted to the nature of ethical concepts, problems are created for modern scholars who are thus hindered in making comparisons between Buddhist and Western ethics. This paper thus examines the continuity between meditation and daily life in the context of understanding the ethical character of meditation as practiced by Tibetan Buddhists. The discussion is largely limited to the practice of meditation as taught in the lam rim (or Gradual Stages of the Path).</p>
This is a study of Tibetan monastic academic traditions in reliance upon the author's own studies within Geluk monastic academies in India. It examines the main intellectual practices of Tibetan scholasticism - the memorization of basic foundational texts, the study of commentaries, oral debate practices and examination procedures. It also considers the liturgical life accompanying these intellectual practices within the monastic community.
<p>This is a study of Tibetan monastic academic traditions in reliance upon the author's own studies within Geluk monastic academies in India. It examines the main intellectual practices of Tibetan scholasticism - the memorization of basic foundational texts, the study of commentaries, oral debate practices and examination procedures. It also considers the liturgical life accompanying these intellectual practices within the monastic community.</p>
<p>This article compares Tibetan Buddhist philosophical ideas with those of Indian presentations on the topic of "real universals as the objective referents of general terms." The article focuses on Gelukpa (dge lugs pa) philosophical literature and the philosophy of the Indian Dharmakīrti. In general Buddhism denies the existence of real universals, however this paper points out that the debate is not without it's controversies. (Ben Deitle 2006-02-23)</p>